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Abstract 
Although it was once considered inevitable that unauthorized copying would harm copyright 
owners, it is now understood that this is not necessarily the case. The concept of indirect 
appropriability played an important role in shaping this newer understanding. In recent years, however, 
many economists seem to have taken the message from this new understanding too far, seeing gains to 
the copyright owners from unauthorized copying in every nook and cranny of the economy, when in 
reality the instances of such gains are likely to be rather limited. The current literature on this subject, 
which consists mainly of theoretical models, seems to be badly out of kilter. In this paper I attempt to 
explain some of the problems and try to provide the outlines of what I believe to be a more balanced 
and nuanced view of copying. It emphasizes the importance of examining various institutional and 
behavioral details of individual markets, which are often overlooked by researchers.   2 
The term ‘pirate’ has historically been associated with the activities of stealing and plundering on 
the high seas. Perhaps because the concept of sea pirates has in modern times largely been relegated to 
children’s stories, these characters have been transmuted, in the public’s mind, into swashbuckling 
heroes with far more charm and generosity than actual pirates were likely to have had. This childish 
view of pirates is not appropriate for real acts of piracy, which should go by the far less romantic 
term—theft. 
It wasn’t so long ago that the act of pirating a product—either by theft, the selling of stolen units, 
or by selling counterfeits—was taken for granted to be harmful to the owner/seller of the stolen good. 
And in most markets in most circumstances this is still assumed to be true. After all, it is easy to see 
how having an unauthorized competing copy, or having stolen inventory available on the market, was 
likely to decrease the profit available to the creator of authorized versions. Why should a consumer 
buy a thousand dollar Rolex watch if they can just as easily impress their friends with one bought at a 
much lower price from the trunk of an automobile, albeit with lower quality or at least a non-functional 
warranty? 
The term pirating is largely used, these days, to describe the unauthorized copying of intellectual 
products such as software, music or movies. It currently appears to be the case that for a majority of 
economics papers on the subject (though this claim is rather casual since I have not done a count of 
these papers), pirating is treated as an activity that should be embraced by the party being pirated, if 
they are farsighted and enlightened e nough. Theoretical models now abound in the literature 
‘demonstrating’ all the ways that the producer of a product might benefit from piracy. Economic 
articles on this subject would seem to imply that it is almost always a terrific strategy to have third 
parties providing free copies of your product. And these articles generally conclude that society would 
almost always be better off in such a situation.    3 
 I take some of the blame for this state of affairs, since my early work discussed instances when 
copying (pirating) might make the copyright owner (seller) better off. The Canadian government asked 
me, in 1979, to investigate the impact of photocopying on copyright owners of printed materials. There 
had been no prior work by economists on the impact of new copying technologies. In the course of that 
examination I postulated some possible alternatives to the negative impacts of copying—the exposure 
effect and, the theme of this set of papers—indirect appropriability. I suggested that these factors 
improved the financial situation of publishers (Liebowitz, 1981, 1985). 
**To be sure, there are possibilities, under certain circumstances, where pirating might have this 
type of beneficial impact on the producer of the real article.
1 But I never claimed that it would apply to 
all situations in all times, or most situations in most times, or even a large minority of instances. And 
for  those instances where I claimed pirating might be beneficial, I provided detailed empirical 
examinations of the conditions in the market to see if they met the theoretical requirements of the 
model, and then closely examined market outcomes to see if the real world worked the way the theory 
predicted it would.  
The current  literature on this subject seems to me to be badly out of kilter, and I try, in the 
following pages, to explain what some of the problems are and what a more reasonable view of 
copying would be. 
I.  The fundamental impacts of piracy 
We can start with the basics. The general expectation is that theft harms the aggrieved party. 
Because of this harm, potential victims will use resources trying to prevent such theft and at its worst, 
production might come to a halt because the costs of protecting property become greater than the 
surplus provided by the property. That is more traditionally known as a breakdown in civilization. 
                                                 
1 For surveys of the literature on copying See Varian (2005) or Watt (2000).   4 
Before economists started to discuss this topic, it was apparent to almost everyone that theft was 
likely to harm the owner of the material that was stolen. This view of the negative impacts of theft on 
the victim was generally applied to the ‘theft’ of intellectual property as well, at least until the last few 
decades. If a pirate video/music company begins to sell thousands of duplicated CDs and DVDs, it is 
generally accepted that such activity is likely to harm the legitimate producers. Even most economists 
are likely to admit that this type of organized pirating is likely to damage the legitimate producers, in 
spite of  models,  discussed in more detail below,  showing how such activity might benefit the 
legitimate producer, particularly if the pirated versions are of lower quality.  
The Substitution Effect 
Prior to 1980 i t was generally thought that unauthorized copying, by allowing individuals to 
consume an intellectual product without having to pay for it, would be harmful to the creators of that 
intellectual product. The unauthorized copy was a substitute for a legitimate purchase and this 
substitution of an authorized copy for a purchased copy was expected to harm the seller. In my early 
work on the subject I referred to this as the substitution effect and acknowledged that it was the 
dominant force both in the market and in the thinking of those contemplating the impact of such 
copying. 
There wasn’t much need to explain how the substitution effect worked. Everyone was familiar 
with the impacts of theft, and the substitution effect worked the same way. 
Benign Theft? 
Theft doesn’t need to harm the victim, however.  It is possible that if a thief steals a 
manufacturer’s shipment of sneakers, but the thief and his compatriots are icons of coolness in their 
neighborhoods, that legitimate sales might increase as other individuals try to imitate the look of their   5 
cool brethren’s stolen sneakers. In this example, therefore, theft might have a positive impact on the 
sales of the sneaker vendor.  
**It is easy to think of other examples. If  youthful  individuals shoplift steaks by putting them 
under their coats, that activity might be beneficial to the butcher in the long run. One might argue, after 
all, that this behavior might induce in the pilferers a lifelong taste for meat which they otherwise might 
not have, and thus, assuming that as adults they continue to patronize the same vendor, the butcher 
might benefit in the long run.  
But I have never seen these types of  arguments put forward in a serious way to suggest that 
society might be better off if the prohibition on theft were overturned. For one thing, it is normally 
assumed that the producer of the product would know about the benefits of giving free samples to 
influential users and would not require being forced at gunpoint to make decisions which turn out to be 
in his own best interest. It also must be acknowledged that the examples above would correctly be 
considered mere exceptions to the more general rule that theft harms the victims. Stealing physical 
goods, therefore, is not considered an issue of economic, moral, or legal ambiguity even though we can 
come up with instances where such activity can be beneficial to those being stolen from.  
Replace steaks, in the above example, with CDs, and very little would seem to be different. In 
fact, no one seems to argue that stealing physical CDs benefits the producer of CDs. This may be 
partly due to the fact that the retail seller of the CD might suffer the harm from the theft. But if the 
CDs were still under the ownership of the producer it seems unlikely that the theft of the CDs would be 
viewed any more favorably.  
In the case of digital theft, however, many economic theorists writing on the subject seem to 
think it  is eminently likely that the legitimate producers will benefit from such activity—in other 
words, benign piracy. Included in this category of potentially beneficial theft is the case of file-sharing,   6 
with its millions of users exchanging files with strangers. The models that have been used to suggest 
the beneficial impacts of copying could apply almost as well to the theft of CDs containing software or 
music or, for that matter, any product of any kind, a point that has been overlooked in the literature. All 
that would differ in models of physical goods would be the cost of the physical good, such as the CD, 
which within the model would be just a particular cost of unauthorized copying that would need to be 
counted against the gains.
2 Just as these theoretical models can merely show the possibility of the gains 
from unauthorized copying, so too can they be used to show a possible gain from the theft of CDs or 
any other physical good. Although  it is often difficult to not be swayed by  results from economic 
models, it is important to remember that models are not random draws, that they are created based on 
factors such as the tastes of the authors and the fads in the profession, and that the proportion of 
models that suggest gains from piracy as opposed to models that focus on the harms to piracy  need 
bear no relationship to the frequency with which piracy might actually benefit copyright owners.  
Indirect appropriability, the exposure effect, and network effects 
There are three possible positive impacts of copying that have been identified in the literature. 
The exposure effect  is basically a free-sample type story. Individuals who  use unauthorized 
copies of works might discover that they  enjoy  those works and this  might lead them to become 
customers. In my early writings on the subject I pointed out that such activity, which now goes by the 
term ‘sampling’, might have a positive or negative impact on overall sales. It is easy to see how 
providing consumers with superior information about their available music choices  might lead to 
increases in sales. Less obvious is the possibility that making fewer mistakes when purchasing items 
can lead to quicker satiation and thus fewer purchases.  Thus the impact of the exposure effect is 
ambiguous, which I have restated in more recent writings (2002). 
                                                 
2 Usually ignored in these models is the possible cost involved when the owners take steps to reduce the ‘theft’.   7 
There are two other possible  factors that might ameliorate the otherwise negative impacts of 
unauthorized copying. The first is indirect appropriability, the topic of interest in this symposium. I 
discuss this at length in the next section of the paper. 
The other factor is network effects. The sneaker example above is an example of network effects. 
In previous writings on network effects (with Stephen Margolis, 2002a) we argued that network effects 
were often being claimed where  none existed, and that the theory was often taking inappropriate 
shortcuts with reality, reducing the applicability and usefulness of  these  models. The focus of  our 
analysis then was not, however, the impact of network effects on copying.  In my opinion, that 
mindset—to overuse network effects—appears again in some models of copying based upon network 
effects, which I will explore in section III.  
II.  The use and misuse of indirect appropriability 
**The basic idea behind indirect appropriability  is that the seller of authorized copies might 
benefit from an increased demand for authorized copies due to the value generated by the unauthorized 
copies. If, for example, everyone who purchased a CD  later made one cassette copy to play in their 
automobile, then the demand for the original CD would increase by the value those individuals placed 
on being able to make the cassette. The seller of CDs could capture some or all of this higher value by 
increasing the price of CDs to match the increase in value due to the unauthorized copying.  
[the old second paragraph is now part of the previous paragraph] 
Alternatively, if  the typical purchaser of a CD made one copy of each CD they purchased and 
gave that copy to a friend, and the friend reciprocates by providing a copy of some other CD, each of 
the friends would value their purchase of the original CDs by an amount that included the presumably 
positive value that the exchange of copies provided.  Their higher demand, again, might be captured by 
the producer through the use of a higher price for CDs.    8 
Finally, if individual subscribers to journals made few if any photocopies of journal articles, but 
the patrons of libraries routinely made many photocopies of articles, the publishers of journals could 
charge a higher price to libraries if the library was capable of capturing some of the additional value 
placed on the journals by the library patrons making those copies.   
**The value from the copies, in all these cases, is captured indirectly since there is no direct 
payment made to the original creator (producer) by the recipient of the unauthorized copy. Note that in 
these examples, although some additional value is generated, the net effect on the seller of originals 
might still be negative. Some of the lost revenue might be recaptured, but it is not clear that all of the 
lost revenue would be captured.  
In order for indirect appropriability to work at all, however, several conditions must hold. 
**First and foremost, the value received by the individual using the unauthorized copy must be 
registered, at least to some extent, with the individual providing the authorized copy from which the 
unauthorized copy is made. This is an absolutely necessary precondition for indirect appropriability. 
Obviously, it is met when the user of the unauthorized copy  is also the purchaser of the authorized 
copy, as in the first example above. This precondition would be met to some degree in the second 
example if the copied CDs that were the quid pro quo in the trade were of value to those receiving the 
copies.  The precondition could be met  in the library  example if the additional value received by 
patrons is transmitted to the library operators in some tangible form. Libraries do not charge admission 
fees, and thus there is likely to be an imperfect linkage between the value of patrons and the budget of 
the library. Nevertheless,  it seems a reasonable assumption that  libraries adjust their budgets  in a 
manner that reflects the desires of its patrons, even if inexactly. That was the assumption that I made 
when I examined the case of photocopying.   9 
**After this precondition is met, one of two other additional conditions must hold. One condition 
is that the variability in the number of copies made from each original must be small, as in the first two 
examples above.
3 If this variability is low, then the increase in demand for originals is fairly uniform, 
allowing the producer of originals to increase the price by a similar amount to all consumers while still 
retaining most sales. If the variability in copies made per authorized original were high, the seller of 
authorized copies would be in the unfortunate position of needing to make a pricing decision which is 
going to lose a good portion of the value being generated by the authorized copies. The seller might 
raise the price of authorized copies by an amount based on the value generated by users making a very 
large number of unauthorized copies. This would be a large price increase and the seller would lose the 
sales from those individuals who do not make many unauthorized copies, of whom there may be very 
many. Alternatively, the seller could raise his price based on the value of unauthorized copies made by 
consumers who make few if any unauthorized copies. This would lead to a very small, perhaps zero, 
price increase for authorized copies. The seller, in this case, would lose the additional value generated 
by individuals making many unauthorized copies.  
If the variability of copies made per authorized original is high, a second condition is required 
for the seller to be able to appropriate much indirect revenue. The condition is that the seller needs to 
be able to charge differential pricing—higher prices for those originals from which the most copies are 
made, as in the library example above, and lower prices for other originals.  
This price discrimination  condition applied to the real world example of photocopying as 
discussed in Liebowitz (1985). Surveys of photocopying activity in the 1970s demonstrated that the 
most heavily photocopied copyright materials were journals, and most photocopying of journals took 
place in libraries.  Publishers of journals charged higher prices to libraries than they charged to 
                                                 
3 Or perhaps more precisely, the additional value placed on an original due to the making of copies should not vary too 
greatly.   10 
individual subscribers, and this behavior began shortly after photocopiers became popular in libraries. 
The most heavily copied journals were also those with the greatest price differentials between 
individuals and libraries. Libraries also dramatically increased their expenditures on journals relative to 
books.  The large number of new journals, which far exceeded  any increase in  the population of 
potential users, was an additional piece of evidence to support a conclusion that photocopying was not 
harming publishers of journals. 
The concept of indirect appropriability has recently been  used by Boldrin and L evine (BL) in 
several papers (2002, 2004) attempting to demonstrate that producers of intellectual products did not 
need protection from rampant copying. Their paper in this volume presents similar claims???? Their 
model assumes that there are a fixed number of unauthorized copies made each period from each copy 
that existed in the beginning of the period. A single competitive price of copies is determined for each 
period and revenues are generated based on that price. Under these circumstances, the seller of the first 
copy can receive the present value of these streams of revenues. They also assume that the elasticity of 
demand is always greater than one.  Even though the price drops every period, the quantity sold 
increases by a larger percentage and revenues continue to increase each period. 
BL’s model was critiqued by Klein,  Lerner, and Murphy  (KLM) (2002) on  several  grounds. 
KLM’s main criticisms were that that BL ignore the variability in copies made from each original, that 
BL’s assumption of an always elastic demand was unreasonable, and that the dramatic decline in prices 
that occur combined with more realistic elasticities would make it impossible for the copyright owner 
to appropriate much in the way of revenues.  
The BL model is an intriguing exposition of how indirect appropriability can work, and that is 
what I see as its virtue. The KLM critique of this model for the case of file-sharing, however, is quite 
convincing. Nevertheless, I think the problems with the BL model, as applied to a more general world   11 
without intellectual property, which is how Boldrin and Levine wish to use it, are greater and at a 
deeper level than indicated in the KLM critique. 
 The fundamental  difficulty, in my opinion, is that BL fall into the trap of ignoring the first 
precondition mentioned above. Their model assumes that the copies made in each period are sold and 
that the seller of what passes for an original at the beginning of a period can capture those revenues. 
With this formulation, a seller in any period is able to capture the present value of the future stream of 
revenue  from all future generations of copies that descend from that original. Under these 
circumstances all revenues then return to the very first original that is made. By structuring the model 
the way they do, they implicitly assume that the precondition above is met. This might be a reasonable 
assumption if all copies that were made in each period were, say, sold in one giant auction on Ebay. 
Such an auction would assure a revenue stream to those who made the copies (you would need to have 
a single auction to keep BL’s assumption of a single price each period). Further, by assuming  that a 
fixed number of copies are made from each original BL eliminate the problem of variability. 
**But copying technologies, in general, and file-sharing systems, in particular, do not operate as 
does Ebay. Explicit revenues are not generated  in a copy market  by the owners of originals. 
Photocopies were not sold at market prices by libraries (the public photocopy machines were usually 
run by third parties the way  vending  machines selling candy tend to be operated). Copies of records 
that were made into audio cassettes and given to friends or relatives were not sold in markets, and any 
reciprocating gratitude would differ among those friends. In these cases, the actual revenue linkage 
was much weaker than that proposed by BL. And these are cases that conform to the BL model better 
than many others.  
Most importantly for modern digital copying technologies, it is certainly not the case that those 
using file-sharing services pay anything to the individual who owns the hard drive from which they are   12 
taking the copy, nor is there even any gratitude that could be converted to value, since the donor of the 
file is anonymous. This completely breaks the linkage between the value of copies and the revenues 
generated from originals and violates this precondition for indirect appropriability to operate.  The 
instances of copying that are in the news and that have attracted so much attention, therefore, do not 
conform to this implicit pre-condition that is required for the BL model to have any validity. 
In the more general circumstance of no copyright in a world with fast and easy digital copying, it 
is difficult to imagine any revenue generation at all, contrary to the claims of the BL  model, which 
merely assumes all the real world difficulties away. 
The only case I know of where unauthorized copies are sold in markets and generate revenues to 
their sellers, in accordance with the BL model, are the organized forms of pirating that virtually 
everyone decries—the types of organizations that make millions of copies of pirated (counterfeit) 
materials to sell. There is a large international market in such illicit software and DVDs. Since these 
markets meet one aspect of the models assumptions, they can help to determine the empirical relevance 
of BL’s model.  
How much revenue do the firms creating the legitimate software or movies receive from these 
illicit markets? 
The answer, quite clearly, is zero—there are no dollars, direct or indirect, being paid by pirates to 
Microsoft for illicit copies of Word, or Pixar for illicit copies of The Incredibles.
4 There are several 
reasons for this, with the primary reason being the inability of the seller to charge a higher price for the 
copy that was used by the pirate to make the thousands of duplicates.  
There are some other, less major, problems with BL’s model. BL make the assumption that 
consumers have a disutility for postponing consumption. But copying that allow extremely rapid 
                                                 
4 Zero is not exactly correct since one legitimate version was presumably purchased, or one theater admission paid in the 
case of the unauthorized DVDs which often appear while a movie is still in theatrical release.   13 
dissemination of the product, as occurs with file-sharing, would lower the price extremely rapidly. This 
rapid decline in prices should be easily predictable by consumers. If prices were dropping 50% per 
day, which seems a conservative figure for file-sharing systems (see KLM who note that if 10,000 
copies were made from each original per period, price would fall 99.99% per period) it is hard to 
imagine many individuals who would not be willing to wait 24 hours for such a large decline in price 
as long as prices were far from zero. Once prices became very low, the absolute fall represented by a 
50% decline would no longer be greater than the benefit of earlier consumption. For the sake of 
internal consistency, BL should have built into their model some form of  requirement that the price 
decline of copies needed to be less than the depreciation in consumption value in order for any trade to 
occur at a positive price. Otherwise the price drops to zero immediately. Of course, this requirement 
would seem to be violated by viral forms of copying, such as Napster and its brethren. 
Indirect appropriability has its uses. I would actually like there to be more applications of the 
concept since I like to see other economists using my work. I am sure there are other instances where it 
could explain the functioning of markets besides the case of photocopying, but only careful empirical 
examinations can provide sufficient detail to know.  Nevertheless, indirect appropriability is not going 
to be a factor in the case of file-sharing. Nor can the BL model be used as a demonstration that indirect 
appropriability  is capable of  replacing the entire copyright mechanism. By leaving out important 
preconditions and conditions for indirect appropriability to work, BL draw a conclusion that is overly 
general when in fact their results are limited to a set of circumstances that is in fact quite narrow. 
III.  The limits of network effects 
**Some products have network effects. These occur when consumers’ values of  the product 
change depending on the number of other users there are of the product. Telephones and fax machine 
are two examples of products where the value of those products depends on the number of individuals   14 
using those products. The sneaker example at the beginning of the article was a hypothetical example 
of network effects where the value that the overall population had for a brand of sneakers depended on 
the number of cool individuals wearing those sneakers.  
It has sometimes been claimed that network effects might be important to understand the impact 
of copying. Conner and Rumelt (1991), Takeyama (1994) and Shy and Thisse (1999) are a small 
sample of  the much larger number of  papers creating models where  network effects lead to the 
conclusion that unauthorized copying might benefit the seller of authorized copies. These models are 
usually put forward in the context of software, although  recent papers by Gayer and Shy (2005), 
among others, apply such models to file-sharing and music.
5 
**The network effects story in the case of copying  is relatively straightforward.  Because the 
pirated version is  less expensive than  the market price of authorized versions, piracy  would be 
expected to increase the number of individuals who use the product. If users of pirated v ersions are 
new users of the product, and if their use increases the value of the product to the purchasers of non-
pirated versions, the piracy should increase total revenue.
6 
**Just because it is possible to construct conditions when network effects might  cause 
unauthorized copying to have a positive impact doesn’t mean it is likely. The sneaker theft example 
mentioned above, for example, is very unlikely to have much real world traction. The gain in sales 
from  the network effects (ignoring how farfetched these gains are in the first place) would be very 
unlikely to overcome the very clear substitution effect caused by the theft. It is obvious that network 
                                                 
5 It is unclear how strong network effects are for different categories of software. For some categories, such as personal 
finance software, network effects might be expected to be weak or nonexistent. In other cases, such as spreadsheets network 
effects are thought likely to be large. Although there have been attempts to measure the strength of network effects for 
spreadsheets, these attempts were marred by using Lotus 1-2-3 file compatibility as measure of network effects when such 
compatibility was also important for upgrading spreadsheet users wanting to remain compatible with their old work 
independent of any network effects.  
6 A variant of this story would be employees who would not pay the full price for a spreadsheet at home, but who are happy 
to install a pirated version. This then allows them to bring some work home and become more adept at using the package. 
This increases the value of the product to their employer who purchases authorized versions of the product.   15 
effects are more likely to overcome substitution effects when the substitution effect is small and the 
network effects are large. Such circumstances may exist in a real market but, to my knowledge, they 
have yet to be documented in even a single instance. 
There are several other issues to be addressed in the context of the impact of network effects on 
the effects of  unauthorized copying. The first is whether there are network effects at work  in the 
market of interest. The second is whether illicit copying increases network effects. Since file-sharing is 
the topic of the day, and the reason for the renewed burst of activity on the economics of copying, I 
will focus on that particular market in the following discussions. 
i.  Are there Network Effects? If so, what kind? 
**As normally modeled, network effects depend on the number of other users of the product.
7 
The more telephones, the more valuable it is to have a telephone. The brand of phone doesn’t matter as 
long as the phones are compatible with each other. In these models the utility of a user is a function of 
the number of other users.  
**Network effects for telephones are obvious. Network effects for software are likely to arise 
when users exchange files with each other, or when they ask one another for help when a problem 
arises with the software. Like phones, computers have network effects as long as there is some level of 
compatibility between computers. It is useful to be able to share files and family pictures.  
**Unlike those cases, however, the linkage of values between different music listeners is far less 
clear. What might be the nature of network effects in music? Although it will happen sometimes that 
one person hears music at a friend’s house and then decides to purchase it for himself, that is not a 
                                                 
7Models based on the number of individuals listening to music are not likely to have any real world viability since just 
about everyone listens to music, meaning that there would be no variation in the measured network effect over time or as 
new copying technologies arose. If network effects do not change, they cannot explain any changes in the market. If the 
measure of network effects is to be impacted by new technologies, it would need to be based on something like the total 
number of man-hours of music listening.   16 
network effect. Encountering new music and then purchasing it is merely a variant of the exposure 
effect (sampling). For there to be a network effect, the value of the music must be higher because 
others also listen to this music. That means that you enjoy the music more because you know that 
others also consume the music. This certainly seems possible. But we actually need more detail than 
this to understand how these network effects might impact music markets. 
**What is it in the psychology of man that would lead to network effects in music consumption? 
If it is related to a desire to be trendy, than the absolute number of users of a musical work may be less 
important than the relative shares of competing works.  Network effects in trendy nightspots, for 
example, tend to lead to rapid changes in fortunes, including declines and bankruptcies for the no 
longer trendy  clubs. We do not know whether the net impact of  these network effects increases or 
decreases the overall  number of people who patronize such  nightspots, however. If there were no 
desire to be chic there might be a more evenly distributed number of patrons across clubs, but it 
unclear whether the total population of club goers would be greater or smaller. 
** I have not seen any discussion of these points in the models of network effects. Instead, the 
network effect  models  merely  assume that  an individual’s  value of music increases  when  others 
increase their consumption of  music. Music is just some amorphous product, like telephones or 
computers. Therefore, if those who did not purchase music before the advent of copying were the only 
ones who increased their consumption of music due to pirating, the network effects they created would 
have a positive impact on the demand for music by the actual consumers and the music producers 
would  face a higher demand for legitimate copies. However, i f the network effects were based on 
relative shares, then the new music listeners would tend to tilt the market toward the products they 
listen to, but overall consumption would remain unaffected.   17 
**The existence of  network effects based on relative shares could lead to important fallacy of 
composition issues ready to trap the unwary analyst. In other words, measuring the impact of network 
effects on individual songs could give very misleading results if generalized to the impact on the entire 
industry. After all, it is quite possible that network effects would increase the sales of songs made more 
popular by copying and at the same time decrease the sales of the songs made relatively less popular, 
compared to their pre-copying sales.  
**Those economists creating models of network effects might just respond “we have assumed 
that network effects are based on absolute usage, not relative usage.”  This of course, would  lend 
credence to the joke about the economist on the desert island who finds a can of food and then solves 
the problem of how to open it by assuming he has a can opener. The problem, of course, is that this 
assumption may not be true. I am not aware of any direct evidence about the nature of network effects 
for music. Do music listeners care very much about how much music everyone else listens to? Perhaps. 
But it is not even clear how they would even know how much music others listen to. Most music 
publications and radio stations place great emphasis on relative sales, but very little emphasis on 
absolute sales. Nor do individuals know how much time their friends spend listening to music, unless 
they live and work together. Instead, they tend to know which songs their friends currently enjoy the 
most. 
**Nonetheless, it is conceivable that upon investigation, that we would discover that there were 
network effects  in music consumption, and these  were based on absolute magnitudes. In the next 
section I explain how it is that that file-sharing might have no impact on these network effects. 
ii.  Does unauthorized copying increase network effects? 
Let us assume that the utility of purchasing any CD increases as other individuals listen to more 
music. This network effect is most consistent with the theoretical models of network effects and file-  18 
sharing, such as that of  Gayer and Shy.
8 Nevertheless, those models demonstrate, at most, that there 
are certain theoretical conditions under which an increase in general network effects brought about by 
copying might benefit the sellers of music.  
A requirement for this result is that file-sharing actually increases network effects. Such network 
effects are presumably related to man-hours spent listening to music, as discussed above. It is unclear 
that file-sharing will increase the time spent listening to music, however, as explained below. 
**It is usually assumed that file-sharing must increase music listening since consumption is 
expected to increase as price decreases, and the price of music is lower on file-sharing networks than 
with the purchase of CDs. Although this is true, it doesn’t make the case that file-sharing increases 
music listening. What is left out of these analyses (in addition to the other left out considerations) is the 
fact that the alternative to file-sharing might not be the purchase of CDs, but instead might be the 
activity of listening to radio. Radio is another free substitute for the purchase of CDs. File-sharing, 
because of it higher quality and ability to match the tastes of the listener better than can a disc jockey, 
is likely to cause individual downloaders to substitute time spent listening to downloaded recorded 
music (from file-sharing networks) for time spent listening to radio. There is no reason to expect file-
sharing to increase the overall time spent listening to music.
9  
**The claim that file-sharing might benefit legitimate record producers due to network effects is 
thus fraught with difficulties. Although it is conceivable that it might happen, several possibilities all 
need to go the right way at the same time. Network effects, if there are any, need to be based on 
                                                 
8 It is the case that these models do not make a distinction between specific and general network effects. Instead the models 
treat music as a single commodity. Thus they could represent a single song, or all music. Since the results are then 
generalized to the entire industry, it would make little sense to view the model as representing only a single song. 
9 **As mentioned earlier, if each hour of music listening provides greater value, there are two contrasting effects that 
determine whether consumption increases or decreases, as I have discussed in several other papers. The demand for hours 
of music consumption will tend to rotate clockwise. The first hours are more highly valued, but satiation is likely to occur 
with a smaller number of hours of music. The net effect is ambiguous. Further complicating this issue is the possibility that 
the constraint on consumption of music is more one of time than one of money. If this is the case, then there is little reason 
to expect time spent listening to music will change due to file-sharing.   19 
absolute and not relative amounts. File-sharing then needs to increase the consumption of music, which 
is not readily apparent. And finally, the network effects need to exert a more powerful increase in 
demand than the decline in demand from individuals who used to purchase CDs but now prefer a free 
substitute (the substitution effect). These are not a set of conditions that seem terribly likely to occur. 
More importantly, these are not conditions that have been documented to exist in any market. 
**The analogous story for software makes somewhat more sense because the possibility of an 
absolute network effect seems greater. Unlike music, using software often requires the help of others 
who are more skilled.  Network effects in software are not thought to be based on trendiness 
(consumers do not pay great attention to those items which are climbing the charts). Further, there are 
no zero cost versions of programs available other than those coming from unauthorized copying (i.e., 
no equivalent to radio) so the users of unauthorized copies might actually increase consumption. It is 
still something of a leap to say that the existence of general network effects would then overwhelm the 
substitution effect, but it is more plausible than it is in the case of file-sharing. 
IV.  Too much theory and too little empirics 
Theory has its place as a useful tool. Nevertheless, when conclusions from theory are applied to 
particular real-world events, as has been the case for all the models discussed, we should insist on 
careful empirical work before we grant much credence to the application of the theory. This is true 
both for models of network effects and indirect appropriability. 
There is some empirical work on these topics. Yet if one looks, it is clear that pure theory articles 
are far more numerous than articles that contain some, or mostly, empirical work. This was a criticism 
that Margolis and I had of much of the enormous literature surrounding network effects. But in most 
cases, those models often had no particular relevance to ongoing debates about public policy, except in 
a most tangential manner.    20 
Articles on the economics of copying, on the other hand, almost always make some claim for 
relevance to ongoing political and policy battles. For example, the Boldrin and Levine articles are 
motivated by an interest in changing the laws regarding intellectual property. I commend the authors in 
this literature for their interest in theory for more than just the sake of theory. But I suspect that bad 
habits learned from work in areas where theory is largely done for the sake of showing what is 
conceptually possible has created a  form of  myopia. This would be a disease that prevents the 
researcher from seeing that theories need to be verified by data before we can take these theories as 
having any particular relevance to the issues at hand. This verification, in my opinion, requires an 
examination of the realism of the assumptions as well as the implications. 
Of course, this is just my view of what I believe to be a malady in the economics profession.  
V.  Conclusion 
Economists have come to understand that unauthorized copying of originals need not have 
negative impacts on copyright owners. That is a useful insight. In their enthusiasm for this insight, 
however, economists seem to have gone too far in the other direction, seeing gains from copying  in 
every nook and cranny of the economy, when in reality the instances of such gains are likely to be 
rather limited. 
The real  insight of these models is an understanding that there are potential competing forces. 
The negative substitution effect is only one factor. But as a general statement, the substitution effect 
needs to be given a wide berth since it is likely to be the most powerful factor at work. For those 
instances where the substitution effect might be overwhelmed, or at least severely limited by these 
alternative factors, a very careful theoretic and empirical examination is required before we can judge 
the outcome.    21 
These evaluations need to be performed on a case by case basis, with a careful examination of 
the  institutional and behavioral details of these  markets and an empirical examination of the 
assumptions required for indirect appropriability or network effects to operate. In the case of file-
sharing it appears that the net impact of these competing forces is far more likely to have a negative 
than a positive impact on sellers, although in particular cases, such as photocopying, this has not been 
the case. The more extravagant claim, that these factors might be considered a replacement for 
copyright, seems entirely unwarranted.   22 
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